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Essay

Super Precedent
Michael J. Gerhardt†
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command in constitutional adjudication, except when it is. The potential of stare decisis as an inexorable command came to public attention when
Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter asked John Roberts
during his confirmation hearings to be Chief Justice of the
United States whether Roberts agreed there were “super-duper
precedents” in constitutional law.1 The nominee left open the
possibility of there being such precedent, though he refrained
from citing specific examples. In asking about “super-duper
precedents,” Senator Specter was reputedly borrowing a notion
of stare decisis initially recognized by Circuit Judge Michael
Luttig, who once referred to Roe v. Wade2 as having achieved
“super-stare decisis” in constitutional law because of its repeated re-affirmation by the Court.3
† Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law and Director of Center on Law and Government, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill School of Law. I am grateful for the constructive and thoughtful
feedback I received on this paper from the participants in the Minnesota Law
Review’s Symposium, The Future of the Supreme Court: Institutional Reform
and Beyond. In addition, I am grateful for the comments I received on this project from participants in a faculty workshop at Cleveland-Marshall Law School
and from Neil Siegal and his constitutional theory discussion group at Duke
Law School. I also thank Jeremy Falcone for his excellent research assistance.
1. See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 4 at 1 (“The term superprecedents first surfaced at the
Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Judge John Roberts, when Senator
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
asked him whether he agreed that certain cases like Roe had become superprecedents or ‘super-duper’ precedents—that is, that they were so deeply embedded in the fabric of law they should be especially hard to overturn.”).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376–77 (4th
Cir. 2000); see also Rosen, supra note 1 (“An origin of the idea [of super precedent] was a 2000 opinion written by J. Michael Luttig, a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who regularly appears on short
lists for the Supreme Court.”).
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In my contribution to this symposium, I explore the significance and coherence of Senator Specter’s and Judge Luttig’s
notions of “super precedent.” In particular, I agree (apparently
with Chief Justice Roberts) that, at least as a descriptive matter, there may be something akin to “super precedent” in constitutional law. The notion of super precedent has something in
common with “super-statutes,” which William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn have described as those statutes that “successfully penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a
deep way.”4 Of course, constitutional precedents have different
legal status than their statutory counterparts: the former may
preempt or displace statutory decisions, and may only be overridden by constitutional amendment or by the Court reversing
itself. While a super precedent begins as a single decision, it
hardly ends there. Super precedents are the doctrinal, or decisional, foundations for subsequent lines of judicial decisions (often but not always in more than one area of constitutional law).
Super precedents are those constitutional decisions in which
public institutions have heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and
consistently supported over a significant period of time. Super
precedents are deeply embedded into our law and lives through
the subsequent activities of the other branches. Super precedents seep into the public consciousness, and become a fixture
of the legal framework.5 Super precedents are the constitu4. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001).
5. Interestingly, Abraham Lincoln recognized something akin to super
precedent. In the course of his debates with Stephen Douglas in their 1857
Senate race, Lincoln contrasted Dred Scott v. Sanford with other constitutional decisions deserving more respect from political leaders. He explained
that
[j]udicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with
common sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profession.
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and
in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been, in no
part, based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if
wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once,
and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of
years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent.
Abraham Lincoln, Response to Douglas in Representatives’ Hall in the Illinois
State House (June 26, 1857), in THE LIVING LINCOLN: THE MAN, HIS MIND,
HIS TIMES, AND THE WAR HE FOUGHT, RECONSTRUCTED FROM HIS OWN WRIT-
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tional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for
courts to decide; it is no longer a matter on which courts will
expend their limited resources. Super precedents are the clearest instances in which the institutional values promoted by fidelity to precedent—consistency, stability, predictability, and
social reliance—have become irredeemably compelling.6 Thus,
super precedents take on a special status in constitutional law
as landmark opinions, so encrusted and deeply embedded in
constitutional law that they have become practically immune to
reconsideration and reversal.
The first three Parts of this Essay are descriptive. Each
considers a principal form in which a Supreme Court precedent
may assume the status of being “super” in American constitutional law. Part I examines super precedent in the form of
foundational institutional practices, such as judicial review.
The second Part examines super precedent in the form of foundational doctrine, which refers to Supreme Court decisions that
govern, support, and define over time basic or general approaches to, or understandings of, certain classes of constitutional disputes. The Court’s standards for determining classical
political questions are a salient example. Part III examines super precedent in the form of decisions on particular questions of
constitutional law that are so well settled and enduringly accepted by the Court, other branches, and the general public
(through societal acquiescence) that they are practically immune to reversal. After identifying several precedents that I believe clearly qualify as “super precedents,” I explore which others may not be super precedents and why, including Roe v.
Wade.
The final Part is both theoretical and evaluative. Initially,
I briefly address a handful of criticisms of super precedent as a
theoretical construct. Second, I consider the implications that
the phenomenon of super precedent pose for constitutional theory and practice. Super precedent poses a problem for constitutional theorists, as well as judicial nominees, who purport to be
rigidly committed to construing the Constitution in terms of a
single unifying concept. Thus, super precedent is important, as
201, 201 (Paul M. Angle & Earl Schenck Miers eds., 1955).
6. I have argued elsewhere that judicial precedents that are deeply embedded into our legal system impose the greatest degree of path dependency,
albeit narrowly, on subsequent constitutional adjudication. Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
903, 951–52 (2005).
INGS

2006]

SUPER PRECEDENT

1207

a practical matter, to the implementation of constitutional values.
As the last Part demonstrates, Supreme Court confirmation proceedings are a crucial forum for implementing, defending, and weakening constitutional precedent. The Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate are gatekeepers in filtering
out the constitutional views that senators want to see reflected
on the Supreme Court. Consequently, super precedent provides
a baseline for measuring whether nominees’ judicial philosophies, or attitudes, fit within the constitutional mainstream.
Super precedent is integral to the Court’s operations because it
is an aspect of the Court that endures in spite of changes in its
composition. Super precedent marks the point at which the institutional values of stability, consistency, institutional and social reliance, and predictability in constitutional law become
compelling, enduring, and fixed. Super precedent reflects, in
short, what may be sacred in American constitutional law.
I. FOUNDATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES
The first kind of super precedent consists of longstanding
Supreme Court decisions that establish what I call foundational institutional practices. These decisions create and maintain particular modes of operation or particular practices that
become indispensable to the functioning of our government.
The practices established by these precedents have become so
well entrenched within our society, have been so repeatedly endorsed and supported by public institutions, and have been the
source of so many other lines of decisions, that they may be undone only through the most extremely radical, unprecedented
acts of political and judicial will.
A prime example of a foundational institutional practice is
judicial review. Over the course of two hundred years, judicial
review has become a permanent fixture of our constitutional
order. Moreover, the scope of judicial review has grown, not
shrunk, over time. While academics and some political leaders
passionately argue against the institution of judicial review
and advocate its abandonment altogether,7 their calls remain
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996) (arguing for the abolition of
judicial review); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 6–53 (1999) (challenging judicial review); Girardeau A. Spann,
Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 656–67 (2005) (arguing for the
abandonment of judicial review in the context of affirmative action).
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unfulfilled. Nor does there appear to be any chance, at least in
the foreseeable future, that those calls will be heeded. There
simply are no signs of any serious and sustained political and
social movement to abandon judicial review altogether. Consider, for instance, that no Supreme Court nominee rejects the
lawfulness of extensive judicial review, and that no one is appointed to the Court with a record of explicitly opposing the institution of judicial review to the Supreme Court.
I merely offer two examples of super precedents which provide (and are widely recognized as providing) support for the
constitutional underpinnings of the institutional practice of judicial review. The first is Marbury v. Madison.8 Marbury was
one of the first, but hardly has been the last, instance in which
the Supreme Court exercised judicial review over the constitutionality of a federal statute. While the Court’s justifications for
exercising judicial review (generally and in the particular circumstances of the case) have been questioned, the institution it
sanctioned endures. The case has effectively become a political
and legal icon as the foundation for the Court’s exercise of judicial review generally and for lawfully subjecting high-ranking
executive officials (including presidents) to the judicial process.
As such, the Court repeatedly cites Marbury as authority for
the exercise of judicial review of executive action and for the
other branches’ actions to limit or constrain judicial authority.9
Countless other decisions by the Supreme Court (not to mention lesser judicial tribunals) rely on Marbury, for both what it
says and what it has come to mean. The case is the standard
citation in textbooks and treatises for the basic practice of judicial review. The decision has become legendary in the study of
constitutional law, and students (from grade school to law
school) as well as lawyers, judges, Justices, members of Congress, and presidents accept Marbury’s recognition of the constitutional authority for judicial review as sacrosanct in American constitutional law. Societal acquiescence in Marbury, as a
defense and authority for the exercise of judicial review of federal authorities, is deeply engrained in the public consciousness
and the fabric of American law. Other public institutions have
come to rely on its endurance for over two centuries. The sym8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (citing Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176, in an attempt to limit judicial authority); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
177, for the exercise of judicial review in an executive official case).
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bolic importance of the case, as it has been applied and repeatedly reinterpreted over more than two centuries, entrenches it
more deeply into the foundations of American constitutional
law. The fact that the decision has constantly been interpreted
and reinterpreted over the years has not robbed it of its significance in constitutional law. To the contrary, the decision’s symbolic importance reflects its enduring value in constitutional
law. Moreover, the fact that the decision is fundamental to constitutional law in more than one way—as the Court’s first
elaborate defense of judicial review as well as one of its first
rulings subjecting high-ranking executive officials to the judicial process—embeds it deeply into the fabric of constitutional
law. Scholars can question Marbury, but overruling the case
and particularly its recognition of the compatibility of the institution of judicial review with the Constitution is unimaginable
(and would require expunging reliance on it in countless other
courts, decisions, and settings).
The other example of a super precedent establishing or reinforcing the institution of judicial review is Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,10 in which the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional necessity for the exercise of Supreme Court review over a
state court judgment resting on interpretations of federal law.11
As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked with reference
to Martin, “I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do
think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several states.”12 While it is
reasonable to assume the public (and perhaps many lawmakers) are not familiar with Martin by name, they are familiar
with, and widely accept, the fact that the Supreme Court may
review the constitutionality of a state law in conflict with some
federal law, state court judgment on federal law, or state actor’s
failure to comply with either the United States Constitution or
other federal law. Every time the Court exercises judicial review over some state action, it reinforces Martin and extends
its legacy. Presidents and members of Congress stand by the

10. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. Id. at 379–80. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), is
equally important for its recognition of the constitutional necessity for Supreme Court review over state criminal cases, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 264, 375–
431.
12. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920).
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constitutional necessity for judicial review of state activity impinging on the federal Constitution or other federal laws. While
Michigan v. Long13 might have given state supreme courts options for maneuvering around Martin,14 no Supreme Court decision has weakened its fundamental importance in constitutional law. And while state officials have sometimes resisted
the logic and implications of Martin,15 they have much more often accepted, as have federal officials, its fundamental premise
as a permanent feature of American constitutional law.
II. FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE
A second kind of super precedent consists of Supreme
Court decisions establishing what I call foundational doctrine.
Foundational doctrine refers to the support in case law for recognizing the existence and application of basic categories,
kinds, or classes of constitutional disputes that endure over
time.
A prime example of this kind of super precedent is the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding the incorporation doctrine,
which provides the basis for the Court’s review of state action
allegedly violating the guarantees of almost all of the first eight
amendments. To be sure, Justice Clarence Thomas has urged
his colleagues to reconsider the Court’s decision making the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment applicable to the
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 But, Justice Thomas stands alone in making this plea.
And while the Court employed more than one standard for determining whether to incorporate a specific guarantee of the
Bill of Rights,17 the Justices uniformly accept the incorporation
13. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
14. Id. at 1044 (holding that when state court decisions rest on federal
law, the Court will infer that the state court believed that federal law required
it to do so).
15. The most prominent example of this resistance can be seen in the
Southern Manifesto. For a general discussion of the resistance to Martin during this period, see WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, & STEPHEN MACEDO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 271–
384 (3d ed. 2003).
16. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which
clearly protects an individual right, applies against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . But the Establishment Clause is another matter.”).
17. Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response
to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 571–72 (1998) (“Initially, the Su-
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doctrine as it stands today—recognizing the incorporation of
almost all of the individual guarantees in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights. They build on that doctrine every
day. Whenever the Supreme Court reviews states’ possible violations of one of the guarantees of the first eight amendments,
it reinforces the incorporation doctrine. The bulk of First and
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, for instance, has been
forged in cases involving the constitutionality of state, rather
than federal, actions. Moreover, incorporation of most of the
Bill of Rights makes judicial review of many other constitutional disputes possible. The incorporation doctrine does not
dictate how the Court ought to resolve particular claims of
state violations of incorporated liberties, but it provides the basis for judicial review of these claims. Consequently, it is easy
to see why a landmark opinion such as Mapp v. Ohio18 has become a super precedent. It recognized a principle that endures
to this day—the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.19 Moreover, it became the foundation on which most judicial review of
Fourth Amendment claims takes place. Similarly, one of the
last cases in which the Court upheld the incorporation of a specific constitutional guarantee, Duncan v. Louisiana,20 may be a
super precedent because it sealed incorporation doctrine at the
same time it set forth an enduring framework for making sense
of the Court’s incorporation doctrine.
Another example of super precedent establishing foundational doctrine is the Supreme Court’s case law establishing
classical political questions as nonjusticiable. In Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall recognized a distinction between a legal question, which a court may decide, and a political question, which is left to the final decision-making of some

preme Court used the fundamental fairness approach to protect certain individual rights against state action. Later, the Court adopted the selective incorporation approach and applied the precise language of portions of the Bill of
Rights against the states. Finally, although the total incorporation doctrine
has never been accepted by a majority of the sitting members of the Court, the
historical arguments made in favor of total incorporation provide an intellectual foundation for the application of the majority of the Bill of Rights against
the states.”).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Id. at 655 (declaring all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment inadmissible in state court).
20. 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
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nonjudicial authority. In Luther v. Borden,21 the Court found
that claims brought under the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause
are nonjusticiable,22 a judgment that endures to this day. Just
as importantly, Luther v. Borden is famous for recognizing the
classical political question doctrine, which treats as
nonjusticiable matters committed by the Constitution to other
authorities’ final decision-making.23 That understanding of the
political question doctrine endured until the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, revised it in Baker v. Carr.24 In that
case, the Warren Court “clarified” the political question doctrine to include several prudential criteria for determining political questions.25 Baker’s articulation of the political question
doctrine has been followed by courts ever since. Thus, Baker v.
Carr is a super precedent because it not only set forth the enduring test for determining nonjusticiable political questions
but also recognized the justiciability of constitutional challenges to gerrymandering.
Powerfully supporting this reading of Baker are the dozens of post1962 voting and school desegregation cases, where the Court has affirmed or required federal court civil rights injunctions in the face of
strong popular and official opposition. Even more dramatic have been
the orders entered in other institutional reform litigation, especially

21. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id. (“[A]ccording to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in
every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and
change their form of government at their own pleasure. But whether they
have changed it or not by abolishing an old government, and establishing a
new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the political power. And
when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.”).
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. Id. at 210–11 (“We have said that ‘In determining whether a question
falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination
are dominant considerations.’ The nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers. Much confusion results from
the capacity of the ‘political question’ label to obscure the need for case-by-case
inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this
Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the
analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine.” (quoting
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939))).
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in the many lawsuits seeking structural reform of state prison systems.26

If that were not enough, Baker and its progeny provided
the foundation for the Supreme Court’s review of the dispute
over the Florida vote count in the presidential election of 2000.
As a practical matter, it was practically impossible to claim the
dispute in Bush v. Gore27 was nonjusticiable, given the Court’s
numerous other opinions, beginning with Baker, allowing judicial review of election disputes.
III. FOUNDATIONAL DECISIONS
This brings us to what is in all likelihood the most controversial form of super precedent. It consists of particular Supreme Court decisions on discrete questions of constitutional
law that (1) have endured over time; (2) political institutions
repeatedly have endorsed and supported; (3) have influenced or
shaped doctrine in at least one area of constitutional law; (4)
have enjoyed, in one form or another, widespread social acquiescence; and (5) are widely recognized by the courts as no
longer meriting the expenditure of scarce judicial resources. After examining several precedents that conceivably qualify as
super precedents in the form of foundational decisions, I explain why several other well-known but persistently controversial precedents are not super precedents. I explain what these
decisions need to demonstrate to attain the special status of
“super precedent” at some future point in constitutional law.
A. ILLUSTRATIONS OF FOUNDATIONAL DECISIONS AS SUPER
PRECEDENT
While I believe it is possible to identify more than a few
examples of super precedent in the form of foundational decisions, I discuss only a few for the sake of brevity. To begin with,
an excellent example of a foundational decision super precedent
is Knox v. Lee (or, the Legal Tender Cases).28 Though not widely
known by name outside constitutional law circles, the American people are very familiar with the outcome of this decision,
because they live with it, and take advantage of it, every day.
Whatever the merits of the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox v.
26. DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1201 (3d ed. 2003).
27. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
28. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
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Lee, its decision to uphold the constitutionality of paper
money29 has become a super precedent. The possibility of overturning the decision—and of returning to a world without legal
tender—is simply unthinkable. There has been extraordinary
social, political, and economic reliance on this decision in both
the public and private sectors. Indeed, no one—not even scholars who believe the case was wrongly decided—seriously believes the decision ought to be revisited. The prospect of the social, political, and economic disaster that would result from its
overruling makes it a permanent fixture in American constitutional law.
Bill Eskridge’s and John Ferejohn’s provocative work on
super-statutes suggest other possible examples of super precedent.30 In particular, they suggest that the Civil Rights Act of
1964,31 the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,32 and the Endangered Species Act of 197333 are examples of “super-statutes.”34
Each of these federal statutes has long been widely accepted
into the public consciousness, and each provides the framework
and support for other legislation.35 One does not have to agree
with Eskridge and Ferejohn that each of these statutes has
quasi-constitutional status36 in order to appreciate that the
constitutional decisions supporting these grand pieces of legislation qualify as super precedents. These decisions each: (1) established fundamental institutional frameworks or principles
in constitutional law; (2) have been consistently supported by
national political leaders for decades; (3) provide support for
additional case law and legislation; and (4) enjoy widespread
public support or societal acquiescence. Consequently, they
have become deeply entrenched in our legal system.37 It is not
important that the public is unaware of the particular names of
the cases supporting these pieces of landmark legislation. What
is important is that the precedents supporting these laws are
as deeply ingrained in our society as the legislation they up29. Id. at 80.
30. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 4.
31. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2000).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (2000)).
34. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 4, at 1231–46.
35. See id. at 1216–17.
36. Id. at 1217.
37. See id. at 1215–17.
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hold. Each time a president renews these laws, expands them,
signs others like them into law, praises them, and looks to
them as models for other laws, they become more deeply entrenched in our culture, our laws, and our society. Political institutions, social movements, economic forces, and the American people have heavily invested in the byproducts of these
decisions. Nothing short of a constitutional revolution could
make the undoing of these precedents possible.
Brown v. Board of Education38 is a case in point. Initially,
the Warren Court’s unanimous decision to strike down statemandated segregation in public schools provoked considerable
backlash, particularly in the South.39 As Michael Klarman and
others have shown, state-mandated segregation in public
schooling did not truly come to an end until national political
leaders fell behind Brown in the late 1950s, particularly
through politically and socially significant legislation such as
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.40
Brown may not have reached “super” status, though, until
the Court systematically struck down state-mandated segregation in public facilities other than schools, the Court acknowledged its foundational status, and it became virtually required
for Supreme Court nominees to declare their acceptance of it as
a condition for their confirmation by the Senate. Robert Bork’s
nomination to the Court foundered in part because of his candid criticism of Brown.41 While Clarence Thomas rebuked the
Court to some extent for its decision in Brown, he did not signal
in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings any agenda or intention to abandon or weaken it. Nor, more importantly, did
Justice Thomas suggest he would call into question the landmark legislation Brown and its progeny arguably spawned,42
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of
Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 396–98 (2000).
40. Michael Klarman, An Interpretative History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 241–43 (1991).
41. Snyder, supra note 39, at 468 (“Responding to a softball question from
Senator Thurmond about this apparent conflict, Bork admitted that ‘as a matter of original intent, I am not at all sure that segregation was not intended to
be eliminated.’” (quoting Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 132 (1987))).
42. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 489 (1991) (“I have no agenda to change existing case law.
That is not my predisposition, and it is not the way that I approach my job.”
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including the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act. Had he called these laws into question, he might have been
rejected. But, he was reluctant to do so, no doubt in part because he understood that to reject these laws would have been
political suicide. Subsequent nominees, including Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, have declared unambiguously their fidelity to Brown and to the landmark legislation,
and thus the precedents upholding them, embedding it deeply
into American culture, society, and constitutional law.43
It would be a mistake to assume all super precedents support liberal policies. For instance, the Civil Rights Cases,44 decided in 1883, are, in all likelihood, a super precedent. The decision recognized a basic principle of constitutional law—that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action45—that
endures to this day. The Court has re-affirmed that principle in
several other cases, most recently in United States v. Morrison.46 Thus, the Court has extended the principle set forth in
the Civil Rights Cases for more than a century, and the principle applies to all constitutional doctrine. The Court has repeatedly fashioned other constitutional doctrine with the stateaction requirement in mind, and Congress has similarly fashioned other legislation with the principle of the Civil Rights
Cases in mind.
Similarly, the Court’s opinion in Washington v. Davis47 is a
super precedent. The Supreme Court has steadfastly stood by
the principle set forth in the case,48 and built many other equal
protection decisions on it until it became an essential, enduring
part of the Court’s framework for equal protection law.

(statement of Judge Clarence Thomas)).
43. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144, 167–68, 262–63 (2005) (statement of Judge John Roberts) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing]; U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee Holds a Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito’s Nomination to the Supreme Court, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/alitoday2.php (Jan. 10, 2006) (transcript at 58) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation
Hearing].
44. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45. Id. at 6.
46. 529 U.S. 598, 599–600 (2000).
47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48. Id. at 239 (holding that a law or official act, without regard to whether
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory impact).
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Yet another super precedent is the well-known separationof-powers decision of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.49 Chief Justice Roberts almost said as much in his confirmation hearings,50 and Justice Alito expressed similar sentiments in his hearings.51 Indeed, Supreme Court Justices for
years have given special deference to the concurring opinion of
Justice Jackson in that case. Members of Congress routinely
cite Youngstown in separation of powers discussions.52 They,
too, tend to defer to Justice Jackson’s concurrence, often referencing it in confirmation hearings. Presidents similarly have
pledged fidelity to Youngstown, frequently citing Jackson’s concurrence as authority. Jackson’s concurrence has become popular because it provides a roadmap for lawmakers to follow.
B. SEPARATING SUPER PRECEDENT FROM INFAMOUS
PRECEDENT
No simple or conclusive test exists to identify super precedent. Some cases may be quite well known because of the controversy that they have generated—Lochner v. New York53 and
Dred Scott v. Sanford54 are but two examples—while other
lesser known cases may have achieved special status precisely
because they no longer generate any controversy. The extent of
a precedent’s notoriety does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is so deeply entrenched in our legal system as to be
effectively immune to reconsideration.
We might be able to agree in the abstract that foundational
decisions may be precedents fixed in the public consciousness
and constitutional doctrine, but we should avoid supposing this
element is the sine qua non of a super precedent. Notoriety is a
factor whose legal significance needs to be carefully measured.
Consider, for instance, whether Miranda v. Arizona55 is a super
49. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
50. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 370 (“I agree with the
basic proposition that the President’s authority is at its greatest when he has
the support of Congress.” (statement of Judge John Roberts)).
51. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 8 (statement of Judge
Samuel Alito, responding affirmatively to Sen. Arlen Specter’s question: “I
want to . . . ask you first if you agree with the quotation from Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in the Youngstown Steel [S]eizure case about the evaluation of
presidential power”).
52. See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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precedent. The case has long had its critics, but a series of factors—the Court’s re-affirmation of the decision in Dickerson v.
United States,56 its persistent backing and long-standing support from law enforcement authorities (for roughly four decades) and from political leaders around the country, and the
public’s recognition and awareness of Miranda—all have given
Miranda iconic status within the law. Moreover, it extends the
Court’s doctrine opposing legislative attempts to overturn its
constitutional decisions and directives on what it to do in constitutional adjudication. The difficulty with characterizing
Miranda as a super precedent is that the Supreme Court has
recognized a number of exceptions weakening (some say, eviscerating) Miranda.57 While the decision endures symbolically in
the public consciousness, it does not endure with the same robustness it first had. It retains limited special status in constitutional law, even in its weakened state.58
Another decision that arguably has some of the qualities of
a super precedent is Wickard v. Filburn.59 Notorious as it is in
some circles, it endures. It is one of several decisions establishing the New Deal’s constitutional foundations.60 Unanimously
decided, it was reaffirmed by the Court in United States v. Lopez.61 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly went out of his
way to reconcile the Court’s decision in Lopez with Wickard and

56. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (striking down
the police practice of first obtaining a confession without giving Miranda
warnings, then issuing warnings and obtaining the confession again, but permitting this practice if the Miranda warnings delivered midstream are “effective enough to accomplish their object”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
655–56 (1984) (creating a public safety exception to the Miranda warnings);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (holding that Miranda
safeguards come into play only when a person in custody is subject to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 224–26 (1971) (allowing statements made before Miranda warnings for
the purpose of impeaching defendant’s credibility).
58. Undoubtedly, the fact that the constitutional scholar who mapped out
a strategy for undoing Miranda lost his cause, but is now a federal district
judge obliged to follow Miranda, further entrenches it in constitutional law.
See Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001). Cassell was sworn in as a U.S. District Court judge for the District of Utah on July 2, 2002. University of Utah,
S.J. Quinney College of Law, Faculty and Administration, http://www.law
.utah.edu/faculty/bios/cassellp.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
59. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
60. Id. at 128–29.
61. 514 U.S. 549, 554–57 (1995).
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to emphasize that the Court in Lopez was not reconsidering or
overturning any of its prior Commerce Clause decisions.62 The
Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich63 further reinforced
Wickard. Nevertheless, Justice Thomas clearly disagrees with
the reasoning in Wickard,64 and Chief Justice Roberts refused
in his confirmation hearings to acknowledge Wickard as firmly
or irrevocably settled. Instead, Roberts suggested that the
question decided in Wickard could come back before the
Court.65 While it may be premature to call Wickard a super
precedent, it comes closer than perhaps Miranda does. Indeed,
it comes closer to being super precedent with each day that
passes and with each piece of legislation Congress passes—and
the Court upholds—in its mold.
Yet another decision that may have some qualities of a super precedent is Griswold v. Connecticut.66 Despite the fact that
the Justices recognized as many as five different theories for
recognizing a marital right of privacy in Griswold,67 and although some conservative scholars continue to pillory the decision,68 Griswold has become entrenched in constitutional law in
a number of subsequent decisions. Moreover, Supreme Court
nominees over the past few decades have realized that accepting Griswold smooths their path to the Court. It has been no
62. Id. at 559–60.
63. 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206–08 (2005).
64. Id. at 2235–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 261–63 (“But I would
say that because [Wickard] has come up again so recently in the Raich case
that it’s an area where I think it’s inappropriate for me to comment on my personal view about whether it’s correct or not . . . . Nobody in recent years has
been arguing whether Marbury v. Madison is good law. Nobody has been arguing whether Brown v. Board of Education was good law. They have been arguing whether Wickard v. Filburn is good law.” (statement of Judge John Roberts)).
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. Justice Douglas found a right to privacy in the “penumbra” of the enumerated rights of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. Justice Goldberg found a right
to privacy in the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(“[S]ince 1791 [the Ninth Amendment] has been a basic part of the Constitution . . . . To hold that a right so basic and fundamental . . . as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in . . .
the first eight amendments . . . is to ignore the Ninth Amendment . . . .”). Justices Harlan and White based their opinion on the Due Process Clause. Id. at
500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. Robert Bork, for example, has acknowledged his disagreement with
the decision. See Linda P. Campbell, Thomas Supports a Right to Privacy: Reply Surprises Democrats; Judge Won’t Discuss Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11,
1991, at A1.
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accident that Justices David Souter and Samuel Alito picked
Justice John Marshall Harlan as one of the Justices whom they
admired most, no doubt because of the eloquence and narrowness of his concurrence in Griswold.69 Chief Justice Roberts,
too, accepted Griswold, albeit narrowly defined.70 The Senate’s
rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Court was
grounded in part on his candid acknowledgment that Griswold
was wrongly decided.71 Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas openly criticized Griswold in their respective confirmation
hearings,72 and Chief Justice Roberts further acknowledged in
his confirmation hearings not only eighty years’ worth of decisions supporting a marital right of privacy but also the absence
of any agenda, or inclination, to undo the decision.73
If Griswold were not yet a “super precedent” for some reason, it may be a consequence of sharp disagreements over its
extension to other realms, especially in the context of abortion
(though it has been recognized by the Court as part of the
foundation of the Court’s relatively longstanding recognition of
a constitutionally protected right to traditional marriage). Justices and others who support the outcome in Roe v. Wade74 may
be eager to give Roe “super precedent” status, but the persistent condemnation of Roe, particularly by national political
leaders—including Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and
George W. Bush, as well as a current majority of the United
States Senate—undermines its claim to entrenchment.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUPER PRECEDENT FOR
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND DESIGN
In this Part, I consider the utility of introducing the notion
of super precedent into constitutional analysis. First, I briefly
address several criticisms of the theoretical construct of super
precedent. Second, I examine the significance of super prece69. See id.; Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 129 (“[Y]ou’ve
expressed admiration for . . . Harlan”) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer).
70. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 565–66 (statement of Judge John Roberts, responding to written questions from Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
71. See Campbell, supra note 68.
72. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1996); Campbell, supra note 68.
73. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 207 (“I agree
with the Griswold court’s conclusion that marital privacy extends to contraception and availability of that.” (statement of Judge John Roberts)).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2006]

SUPER PRECEDENT

1221

dent as a crucial mechanism for implementing constitutional
values.
A. RESPONSES TO FIVE CRITICISMS
At least five criticisms may be leveled against importation
of the concept of super precedent into constitutional law. First,
Professor Randy Barnett argues against recognizing any prior
Supreme Court decisions as super precedent on the ground that
it would immunize at least some questions of constitutional law
from ever being reconsidered.75 The danger is that declaring
something as super precedent makes it off limits for criticism
or correction. He suggests that the Court always needs to have
the freedom to reconsider its precedents whenever it deems reconsideration appropriate.76
The principal difficulty with this criticism is that super
precedent plays an important function in constitutional law.
Super precedent is a construct employed to signify the relatively rare times when it makes eminent sense to recognize
that the correctness of a decision is a secondary (or far less important) consideration than its permanence. Securing the permanence of some decisions extends all of the institutional values advanced by fidelity to precedent, including the
preservation of stability and scarce judicial resources. Moreover, judicial closure on some constitutional questions ought
not to be confused with the extent of a precedent’s constraining
effect on subsequent adjudication. Merely designating something as super precedent does not preclude scholars from questioning a judicial decision (as some scholars still do, for instance, with respect to the Court’s incorporation doctrine) or
developing a sustained attack on seemingly settled constitutional doctrine. The point is that a super precedent is the culmination of sustained support from political leaders and the
federal judiciary generally, including the Court, over time. The
enduring support is the (short) answer to Professor Barnett’s
concerns.
The second criticism is the apparent impossibility of determining the requisite length of time that a judicial precedent
must endure before it may be designated as a super precedent

75. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1238–47
(2006).
76. Id.
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in constitutional law. The problem with super precedent is that
time alone is not a reliable measure of the special status of at
least some precedents in constitutional law.
I agree that time alone is not the measure of a precedent’s
attainment of special status in constitutional law. Moreover, I
concede the impossibility of determining a minimum length of
time for a precedent to endure before it may be called a super
precedent. It is of course impossible to know what will happen
years or centuries from now. No one can prove that the Court
will refrain from reconsidering for all time some decisions
which we think are firmly settled. Nevertheless, focusing on
the longevity of a precedent misses the point. Longstanding
precedents, especially in important cases, are rarely overturned
in a single bound. A case that can credibly be characterized as a
super precedent is distinctive in part because it is so deeply engrained in constitutional law that it cannot be reconsidered—
much less overturned—without considerable excavation. In
practice, this means that if and when the time ever came to reconsider super precedent it would only occur after persistent
warnings and attacks (both on and off the Court). Plessy v. Ferguson,77 for example, was not simply left untouched in a shrine
until the Court began to dismantle the decision in the 1950s. To
the contrary, it was attacked systematically in a series of lawsuits brought by the NAACP, culminating in Brown.78 Similarly, the so-called right to contract recognized in Lochner v.
New York79 was not only overruled sub silentio a few years
later80 but the right to contract it recognized was the target of a
good deal of litigation for decades.81 Important cases tend not to
disappear in the absence of concerted, sustained efforts to overrule them. The time required for precedents to become deeply
entrenched and immune to reconsideration is less important
than the fact that persistent challenges are indicia of the failure of precedents to achieve super precedent status.

77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
78. 347 U.S. 483.
79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), implicitly overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–98 (1937).
80. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 397–98.
81. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 921 (1952); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by
West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 388–400.
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The third criticism follows from the second. It maintains
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove the existence of a
super precedent. If it were possible that any precedent, no matter how fixed at a given point in time, could conceivably be subject to reconsideration, then it makes no sense to declare something as a super precedent. The status, after all, is apparently
subject to change, not to mention the exasperating difficulty of
not being able to demonstrate once and for all that a particular
decision qualifies as a super precedent.
This criticism misses the mark. Very few cases are likely to
qualify as super precedents. We can only be sure whether
something qualifies as a super precedent after we verify the
convergence of a number of factors in support of a particular
decision. The important point is that the factors are relatively
clear. The challenge in demonstrating something as a super
precedent is ensuring that all relevant factors are in fact present and fixed.
The fourth criticism is that many of the cases we call super
precedents—Brown, for instance—appear not to have had fixed
meanings over time. In constitutional adjudication, the Court
often redefines, reinterprets, and modifies its prior decisions.
Thus, many cases apparently fail to qualify as super precedents
because the initial decision—or, at least what the Court said in
it about the Constitution—has not endured intact.
The fact that a precedent’s meaning has not remained narrowly fixed is, however, not necessarily an indication it has
failed to achieve the status of a super precedent. Every judicial
precedent has the potential to perform many functions in constitutional law. What matters is whether a precedent continues
to perform at least one of these basic functions, which include
(but are not limited to) constraining subsequent litigation, political symbolism, framing the Court’s agenda, facilitating a
public dialogue on constitutional meaning, educating the public
(or others) about the Constitution, implementing constitutional
values, and chronicling or clarifying constitutional history. A
super precedent needs to perform only one of these functions,
not all of them.
The fifth criticism is that there appears to be no doctrinal
support for the notion of super precedent. I agree that the
Court has not recognized the concept of super precedent and
that the Court is unlikely ever to do so. But, it is safe to say
that the Court talks about some prior decisions as if they had
such status. There are cases that the Court treats as if they
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were super precedents, and Marbury82 is just one example.
Moreover, the point is not whether the Supreme Court expressly has used the magic words “super precedent” to describe
some of its decisions. The point is that super precedent is the
culmination of a series of constitutional decisions both on and
off the Supreme Court. A single factor is not enough, at least in
my judgment, to establish something as a super precedent. But,
the absence of a single factor may be enough to deprive a decision of the status of being a super precedent. Becoming a super
precedent requires the convergence of a number of factors, including consistent support from national political leaders as
well as the Court for a particular constitutional judgment.
Thus, a closer look at the confirmation process for Supreme
Court Justices as one forum for expressing such support may
be in order.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUPER PRECEDENT FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
As Daniel Farber has suggested and as I have argued
elsewhere, a fundamental tension exists between respect for
precedent and inflexible adherence to a judicial philosophy of
original understanding.83 Supreme Court and other judicial
nominees got into trouble in the 1980s and 1990s because, as
Henry Monaghan has pointed out, considerable constitutional
doctrine is not based on and is fundamentally irreconcilable
with original understanding.84 The most rigorous originalist
must acknowledge this doctrine as all wrongly decided, and intellectual integrity requires they vote to overturn any decision
they deem as wrongly decided. Originalists, at least the most
rigorous ones, have difficulty in developing a coherent, consistently applied theory of adjudication that allows them to adhere to originalism without producing instability, chaos, and
havoc in constitutional law. Strict adherence to originalism requires some upheaval in constitutional law.
A possible explanation for the existence of the three different kinds of super precedent is that each reflects, in a different
way, the intricate network effects of multiple judicial and po82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 25
(2002).
84. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 724–27 (1988).
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litical practices and decisions. Once other institutions invest in,
and rely upon, particular judicial practices and decisions, these
practices and decisions become more deeply ingrained in our
legal system. The more ingrained a particular judicial practice
or decision, the more difficult it becomes to undo. As layers become deeply embedded and encrusted, the more immune they
become to judicial excavation.85 Of course, why some rather
than other judicial practices and decisions become deeply ingrained remains a difficult question. Because these appear to
be network effects, it is useful to examine the network within
which the Justices operate.
The construction of the Supreme Court is the consequence
of a series of political choices by national political leaders. The
Court tends to be what political leaders make it. Thus, it is interesting to note that three successive Republican appointees
as Chief Justice—Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and
John Roberts—were each appointed to help lead the Supreme
Court away from what it had become under an earlier Chief
Justice, Earl Warren. Yet, much of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence endures, in spite of the fact that in the 36 years since
Earl Warren left the Supreme Court, Republican presidents
have appointed 11 of 13 Justices.86 A theory worth pondering is
whether, in spite of the rhetoric of these presidents, political
circumstances have made it impossible for them to achieve
their professed agendas. Political circumstances have conceivably made the appointments of Justices with radical views regarding stare decisis impossible. Let me put the point a different way. When some conservative commentators cite the three
or four decisions they most would like to see overruled, they often cite such cases as Roe v. Wade, Lemon v. Kurtzman,87 and
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.88 These
are of course Burger, not Warren, Court decisions, while the
85. This tracks Barry Friedman’s and Scott Smith’s notion of the sedimentary Constitution. See generally Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
86. U.S. Supreme Court Justices, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/portlet/
justices/chrono (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (offering links to brief biographies of
each Supreme Court Justice).
87. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (establishing a three-pronged test for determining whether a government-sponsored message violates the Establishment Clause).
88. 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (holding that the determination of state
immunity from federal regulation does not turn on whether a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional”).
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decisions that often provoke derision of the Supreme Court
these days are such cases as Lawrence v. Texas89 and Roper v.
Simmons90 (but not United States v. Virginia (VMI),91 Romer v.
Evans,92 or the older case of Goldberg v. Kelly93). As the Warren
Court recedes into memory, its precedents become harder to extract. They become more calcified. As they become more calcified, they become more entrenched. As they become more entrenched, some continue down the path toward becoming super
precedents.
The nominations of John Roberts, Harriet Miers,94 and
Samuel Alito are instructive. The Senate performs a critical
function as a gatekeeper to filter out the views it wants to see
reflected and those that it does not want to see reflected on the
Court. Their respective confirmation proceedings reflected the
Senate’s perennial efforts to use its confirmation authority to
weaken Supreme Court decisions with which it disagrees and
strengthen those with which a critical mass of senators agree.95
The respective journeys of these nominees through the confirmation process were different from those followed by the embattled judicial nominees of the 1980s and 1990s. John Roberts
avoided controversy by rejecting fidelity to any particular theory of constitutional interpretation. Instead, he espoused a philosophy of “judicial modesty;” he likened judging to umpiring;
and he called himself someone who liked “bottom-up” judging,
which included a healthy degree of respect for stare decisis.96
89. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down the ban on sodomy).
90. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (finding the execution of minors unconstitutional).
91. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (considering the Virginia Military Institute’s
admissions policy).
92. 517 U.S. 620, 623–26 (1996) (finding Colorado’s ban on protection to
victims of sexual orientation discrimination unconstitutional).
93. 397 U.S. 254, 269–71 (1970) (holding that states must give a hearing
to public aid recipients before the aid is ended).
94. Michael Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A1.
95. The dynamic works in both directions—the Senate helps to shape the
Court and the Court influences how the Senate functions in confirmation proceedings (and other settings in which it renders constitutional judgments). On
the important relationship between the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision making and the constitutional activities of nonjudicial actors (including
the President and the Congress), see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court Term:
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Court, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003).
96. See Jeffrey Rosen, Answer Key, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2005, at
16, 20.
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Part of the brilliance of Roberts’ descriptions of himself is that
he invented new concepts with which to discuss judicial philosophy that had the multiple advantages of not appearing to
be inconsistent with substantial amounts of constitutional law,
of appealing to those evaluating him, and of not backing him
into a corner on the cases likely to come before him over the
next few decades.
Yet, Roberts, Miers, and Alito each owed their respective
nominations to a president who had vowed not to make the
mistakes of his Republican predecessors—namely President
Reagan and his father—in appointing Justices who failed to
fulfill the Republican agenda of overturning liberal decisions
such as Roe v. Wade. President George W. Bush seemed determined to go further when he promised to nominate “strict constructionists” and people in the mold of Justice Antonin Scalia
or Justice Clarence Thomas,97 both of whom had made clear
their desires to overrule the precedents long criticized by conservative scholars and activists. But, at least one problem
President Bush and particularly his Supreme Court nominees
encountered seems to have been super precedent. Nominees
with public records of opposing the decisions that President
Bush or others have wanted to undo encounter an insurmountable problem in the form of super precedent. The President
avoided nominees with judicial philosophies that clearly would
have led them to favor overruling not just arguably settled
cases like Roe and Griswold, but more deeply entrenched decisions supporting the constitutionality of the New Deal, the
Great Society, and landmark environmental legislation. The
latter nominees had philosophies that would have appeared, in
other words, to have led them to favor producing havoc or chaos
in constitutional law. Someone who would seem to favor producing havoc or chaos in constitutional law is a hard sell not
only to the Senate, but also the American people.
Chief Justice Roberts was a model for avoiding pitfalls in
the confirmation process. It is possible he may have been too
good a model. He constantly espoused respect for precedent
throughout his hearings. He may or may not have been a firebrand when he worked in the Office of the Attorney General,
the White House, or in Office of the Solicitor General, but he
was not a firebrand when he appeared in front of the Senate
97. See Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court: Conservatives, Liberals
Ready for Heated Debate, CNN.COM, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush/index.html.
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Judiciary Committee. He no doubt understands that President
Bush would love to see him not only vote as Chief Justice
Rehnquist did but also move the Court further to the right. Yet,
John Roberts the nominee accepted some judicial decisions inconsistent with that political agenda, including those recognizing a marital right of privacy,98 the framework for analyzing
separation of powers conflicts,99 the constitutionality of the
1965 Voting Rights Act,100 and heightened scrutiny for gender
classifications.101 Roberts even acknowledged Roe as “settled
law,” and recognized that overruling a precedent would be “a
jolt to the legal system.”102 One has to assume that some overrulings would produce more of a “jolt” to the system than others, and some might fatally electrocute the system. While Chief
Justice Roberts suggested it was not unthinkable for the Supreme Court to overrule settled law, he made abundantly clear
that his philosophy of judicial modesty is grounded, at least in
part, on respect for what came before. Roberts acknowledged
that predictability, stability, consistency, and reliance are values to be taken into account in constitutional adjudication, and
it would seem to follow that these values ought to count in most
cases.103 It further follows that there may be at least some instances in which the values promoted by fidelity to precedent
become compelling. A Court that overrules too many precedents
not only sets a bad example for the Courts that follow (because
it provides no incentive to respect the work of its predecessors),
but also signals permission for other branches to view its decisions with the same lack of respect with which it views them. A
healthy respect for precedent means learning to live with decisions with which you disagree. When Roberts went further to
describe himself as a “bottom-up” kind of judge,104 he signaled
that his inclination is to decide cases incrementally and to infer
principles from the records of the cases below. A bottom-up
judge is willing to learn from experience, which necessarily
means that a good deal of our experience has to be left in tact.

98. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 186 (statement of
Judge John Roberts).
99. Id. at 382 (statement of Judge John Roberts).
100. Id. at 169 (statement of Judge John Roberts).
101. Id. at 190–91 (statement of Judge John Roberts).
102. Gwyneth K. Shaw, Roberts: Roe ‘settled as precedent’, BALT. SUN, Sept.
14, 2005, at 1A.
103. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 20.
104. See id.
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Harriet Miers, in the short period in which she was a
nominee to the Court, took pains to avoid appearing as if she
favored any radical thinking, or results, in constitutional law.
To be sure, she had no public record of radical opinions—
indeed, she seemed to have few if any fixed opinions about constitutional law. This might have made her attractive as a
nominee to President Bush—she might have been a nominee
who was committed to ruling as he would have liked but who
had no paper trail suggesting any such disposition. Interestingly, it was the President’s supporters who questioned her
credentials most vigorously. They wondered, not too subtly,
whether she would become the “obsequious instrument of [the
President’s] pleasure,” as Alexander Hamilton once described
the kind of nominee the Senate ought to reject.105 She tried to
answer the concerns of her critics with assurances that she believed judges needed to be “humble,” language that had been
intended, no doubt, to echo Chief Justice Roberts. When Republican senators, among others, demanded to see some of her
work as Chief White House Counsel in order to get a better
idea of her ideological commitments and professional competence, the President refused on the basis of executive privilege.
In the end, she withdrew her nomination to avoid jeopardizing
the confidentiality of her work as Chief White House Counsel.106
In the immediate aftermath of Miers’ withdrawal, it was
not clear whether, or why, the White House had failed to foresee that her nomination would have triggered opposition on
ideological grounds from conservatives or requests for documents arguably protected by executive privilege. Whether the
assertion of executive privilege was genuine or merely a pretext
for her withdrawal, it is noteworthy that she based her withdrawal on her (and the President’s) adherence to a conventional
position—protecting the confidentiality of the work product of
the White House Counsel’s office.107 Defending a nomination on
the basis of a disregard for a fundamental principle of separation of powers—respect for executive privilege—would not have
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
106. Edward Epstein, Miers Withdraws as Court Nominee, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 28, 2005, at A1.
107. Id. (“‘I have steadfastly maintained that the independence of the executive branch be preserved and its confidential documents and information
not be released to further a confirmation process,’ [Miers] wrote in her withdrawal letter.”).
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helped the nomination. The nomination would have become
mired in fallout from the President’s failure to demand respect
for executive privilege in that setting.
Enter Judge Samuel Alito. Judge Alito’s fifteen-year record
on the federal court of appeals demonstrates, among other
things, a variety of propensities, including deference to executive power and construing congressional powers narrowly.108 As
a lower court judge, he demonstrated respect for Supreme
Court precedent. Yet, his record also included harsh criticisms
of some Supreme Court precedents made while he was working
for the Reagan Justice Department.109 In his Supreme Court
confirmation hearings, he repeatedly stressed that his personal
views would play no role in his discharge of his duties as a Supreme Court Justice.110 As a witness, he said as little as possible on most subjects. To the extent he addressed the subject, he
expressed almost as much respect for stare decisis as Chief Justice Roberts did in his confirmation hearings.111 While Justice
Alito indicated his concerns that the Court’s attempt to maintain a strict wall of separation between church and state has
not always been coherent or workable,112 he avoided that subject in his hearings. He hastened to reassure senators of his
recognition of the right to privacy at least to the extent it was
recognized in Griswold.113 His supporters repeatedly praised
his temperament and characterized him as a humble person—a
man with a “great heart”—likely to appreciate and embody the
108. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 18–20.
109. Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle,
WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A1.
110. See Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 29–32 (statement of
Judge Samuel Alito, responding to questions and comments from Sen. Ted
Kennedy); id. at 41–42 (statement of Judge Samuel Alito, responding to questions from Sen. Charles Grassley); id. at 93–101 (statement of Judge Samuel
Alito, responding to questions from Sen. Jeff Sessions).
111. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 3, 4, 6, 7, 28, 124, 128,
131, 133 (statements of Judge Samuel Alito).
112. Charles Babington, Senators Praise Nominee’s Candor: Alito Shows
Willingness to Discuss Controversial Issues Facing Supreme Court, WASH.
POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at A7 (“Many liberal groups fear further erosion of the
separation of church and state if the court shifts to the right . . . Sen. John
Cornyn (R-Tex.) told reporters that Alito ‘did commiserate with me a little bit
about the problems that the Supreme Court has had in coming up with a coherent body of law that is clear and can be easily applied, and can be predictable in a way that doesn’t discourage people from expressing their religious
views.’”).
113. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 2, 134 (statements of
Judge Samuel Alito).
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importance of humility and modesty in judging.114 Throughout
the hearings, Republican senators defending Alito discounted
any possibility that his appointment could destabilize the
Court, constitutional doctrine, or both.115
CONCLUSION
John Roberts’ confirmation as Chief Justice of the United
States was historic for a number of reasons. Besides becoming
the youngest Chief Justice since John Marshall was appointed
in 1801 at the age of 45, Roberts’ confirmation hearings featured some new terminology for describing judging and constitutional law. In particular, he did not dispute (at least expressly) that some prior decisions of the Court may be fairly
described as super precedent because of their legal, social,
and/or political importance. As a descriptive matter, it is possible to identify such precedent in constitutional law. Super
precedents may have several distinctive features, including establishing basic frameworks or propositions of constitutional
law; receiving repeated support and reinforcement by national
political institutions, the Court, and societal acquiescence; and
providing the foundation for the development of constitutional
doctrine in one or more areas. Precedents with these features
may come in such diverse forms as supporting foundational
practices, foundational doctrine, and foundational decisions. In
whatever form they come, however, they pose challenges to
constitutional theorists, who must adjust their descriptive
theories of the Court’s operations to account for their functional
status as super precedents. Moreover, the possible existence of
super precedent provides a basis for future questioning of Supreme Court nominees, and perhaps even other judicial nominees. Super precedent may be an integral part of the Court that
endures over time. It may thus become an important consideration in evaluating not only future Supreme Court nominees but
also future efforts to reconfigure the institutional design or operations of the United States Supreme Court.

114. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 43, at 546 (statement of
Sen. Tom Coburn).
115. See Babington, supra note 112.

